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THE CANADA PENSION PLAN: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
RANDALL ELLSWORTH and GWYNETH PEARCE*
RsUMt
Dans cet article, les auteurs 6tudient les plus importants ddveloppements
ldgislatifs et politiques de 1996 de m~me que les importantes ddcisions prises
au cours de l'annde en ce qui a trait au Rdgime de pensions du Canada. Les
auteurs font 6galement 6tat des initiatives gouvernementales visant k rdformer
le rgime de pension du Canada et pr~sentent une analyse critique de certaines
des options qui sont h l'6tude.
A. INTRODUCTION
The Canada Pension Plan1 turned thirty in 1996, as Ottawa launched a major
review which has led to fundamental changes in the way the plan is funded and
administered. Clearly, one of the targets of CPP reform is the disability benefit
scheme. "Unprecedented" increases in the cost of CPP disability claims were
reported in 1996.2 At the same time, the federal department responsible for
administering the CPP, Human Resources Development Canada,3 began to
apply new guidelines for determination of disability, and the Pension Appeals
Board4 appeared to become increasingly restrictive in its interpretation of the
disability test. It was a year of shifting ground on both adjudicative and political
levels.
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1. Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, as amended [hereinafter "the CPl'].
2. Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 17: Human Resources Development
Canada- Canada Pension Plan: Disability (September 1996).
3. Hereinafter "HRDC".
4. Hereinafter "the PAB".
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B. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Legislative Changes
Several significant amendments contained in a bill passed in July 19955 but
which remained unproclaimed at that time were finally declared in force as of
January 1, 1997. Supporting amendments to the regulations were also
announced. A major structural change resulting from these amendments is that
Old Age Security6 appeals, which had previously been heard separately, will
now be merged into the CPP appeal system. CPP Review Tribunals now become
CPP-OAS Review Tribunals. 7
The January 1997 amendments also include changes to allow for broader
delegation of powers by the Minister;8 to permit more information-sharing
between federal and provincial authorities; 9 to tighten up the expanded defini-
tion of "family allowance recipient"; 10 to eliminate the Schedules listing coun-
5. See discussion of Bill C-54 in G. Pearce, "Under Siege: Canada's Public Pension
System in 1995", (1995), 11 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 [hereinafter Pension Review
1995) at 20.
6. Hereinafter "OAS".
7. See section 2 of the CPP. A person seeking to challenge a negative OAS decision must
now make a request for a reconsideration by the Minister before commencing a Review
Tribunal appeal. Prior to January 1997, the reconsideration step was optional in OAS
matters: see sections 27.1 and 28 of the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9, as
amended. However, a further appeal to the Pension Appeals Board is only an option in
CPP cases. The Review Tribunal remains the final appeal body for OAS matters, sub-
ject to the possibility of judicial review.
8. Prior to Bill C-54, the CPP provided that any delegation of powers was to be effected
by regulation. All references to specific department officials have now been replaced by
the general term "the Minister". Broad delegation powers are assumed by virtue of sec-
tion 24 of the federal Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, as amended.
9. Section 81(1) of the Canada Pension Plan Regulations, CRC 1978, c. 385 as amended
(hereinafter "the CPP Regulations") now allows the federal government to provide
information from an individual's CPP file to a provincial government under an informa-
tion-sharing agreement pursuant to section 105(2) of the CPP, as long as it is used for
the purpose of "the administration of' one of a number of provincial programs, includ-
ing, for the first time, workers' compensation programs. The previous requirement that
the information be used to determine eligibility or entitlement under the provincial pro-
gram has been dropped.
10. The definition of "family allowance recipient" is relevant to the application of child
rearing dropout provisions. Section 42(1) contains a basic definition of "family allow-
ance recipient", which is expanded in section 77 of the CPP Regulations, to include
persons eligible for the current Child Tax Benefit as well as spouses of persons in
receipt of the former family allowance.
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tries with reciprocal social security arrangements with Canada; 11 to facilitate
the use of electronic communications; 12 to require more particulars in notices
of appeal to the Review Tribunal and applications for leave to appeal to the
PAB;13 and to specifically provide for preliminary written motions and adjourn-
ments in PAB appeals. 14
2. Policy Changes
(a) Disability Determination
In September 1995, HRDC issued a new policy directive entitled "Medical
Determination of Disability under the Canada Pension Plan ".i5 This directive
took effect immediately but it was not made widely available until the spring of
1996.16 It is extensive and is intended to take precedence over other policy
documents pertaining to the medical determination of disability. In particular,
the 1995 Disability Policy specifically rescinds the old "Policy Guideline on
the Determination of Disability",17 which had been in effect since 1989.
Interestingly, CPP management has credited the new policy for an unexpected
decline in the actual number of CPP disability beneficiaries in 1996.18
11. It was viewed as "administratively difficult and cumbersome" to keep the Schedules
current: see Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement following SOR/96-521 in Canada
Gazette Part II, Vol. 130, No. 26 (December 25, 1996). Concluded agreements will
continue to be published in the Canada Gazette Part II.
12. The Canada Pension Plan Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 385, as amended [hereinafter
CPP Regulations] now provide that requests for reconsideration are to be conveyed
"electronically or by any other means acceptable to the Minister", while the phrase
"delivering or mailing" in the Review Tribunal Rules of Procedure, SOR/92-19, as
amended by SOR/96-523, has been changed to the broader term "conveying".
13. See Review Tribunal Rules of Procedure, ibid, and Pension Appeals Board Rules of
Procedure, C.R.C. 1978, c. 390, as amended, most recently by SOR/96-524.
14. Pension Appeals Board Rules of Procedure, ibid.
15. Policy Directive #04195-CPP-03 [hereinafter "the 1995 Disability Policy"].
16. For many of us, the first indication of new policy guidelines was a reference to them in
an Annex to the information paper on the CPP released by the federal, provincial and
territorial governments of Canada in February 1996, "An Information Paper for Consul-
tations on the Canada Pension Plan", infra, at note 85.
17. Appendix 2-3-C in the CPP Operations Manual [hereinafter "the 1989 Disability Pol-
icy"].
18. In September 1996, the Auditor General of Canada reported that the number of benefi-
ciaries had decreased for five straight months. See Report of the Auditor General of
Canada, supra, at note 2. The Auditor General of Canada welcomed the new disability
determination policy as a positive move, in that it attempts to more clearly define eligi-
bility criteria, but suggested that it might have been more appropriate for such key
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One important difference between the 1989 Disability Policy and the 1995
Disability Policy is that the new guidelines do not attempt a definition of
"disability", although they note that some conditions 19 constitute very strong
evidence that the individual is disabled for CPPpurposes. By contrast, the 1989
Disability Policy defined "disability" generally as:
... any restriction or lack of ability (resulting from an impairment), to per-
form an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for
the human being. (World Health Organization common definition).
The 1995 Disability Policy clearly accepts that personal factors must be taken into
account at least to a certain extent in making a determination of disability. It
confirms that an applicant's medical condition is always the "prime indicator" in a
disability determination but acknowledges that, in assessing a medical condition,
a number of factors must be considered, including "personal attributes". 20
The guidelines cite a 1974 Pension Appeals Board case, Minister of National
Health and Welfare v. Montpellier21 and state:
It is well accepted among disability experts that, to assess how a particular
medical condition affects a person's abilities, personal factors are part of the
assessment. To completely remove references to personal factors could, at
an extreme, lead to an impairment-related benefit system based exclusively
on a particular medical diagnosis instead of an administrative decision on
disability. Therefore, the disabling influence of the medical condition is
determined by relating it to a "person".2 2
guidelines to have been entrenched in the legislation rather than left to policy. The
Report criticizes CPP disability administration for inconsistencies in adjudication and
file documentation and recommends the introduction of a formal and systematic quality
control review of adjudicators' decisions.
19. Including "a cerebrovascular accident with paralysis, AIDS, cancer with metastasis,
advanced multiple sclerosis, advanced Parkinson's disease, or almost any advanced
degenerative condition".
20. The other factors listed in the policy are: the nature of the medical condition, functional
limitations, impact of treatment, medical statements, and multiple medical conditions.
21. (1974), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8643.
22. The guidelines go on to suggest that appropriate questions to ask in determining disabil-
ity would be:
Q: Given the individual's medical condition, and all its characteristics, is it reasonable
to expect that the person could do some kind of gainful work?
Q: Does the medical condition, in conjunction with the individual's educational level
and job skills influence against a finding that the individual is capable of working?
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In the Montpellier case, a 50-year-old miner with a grade 7 education had
developed degenerative disc disease preventing heavy labour, and had tried
unsuccessfully to maintain his former employment. The PAB held that, consid-
ering his limited education, his honest attempts to secure less stressful employ-
ment and his nervousness, irritability and depression, it was unrealistic to expect
that the applicant could pursue substantially gainful employment.
This clear recognition by HRDC that disability must be assessed in the context
of the individual is a very positive step. However, the new guidelines also
specifically emphasize that "socio-economic conditions are not to be consid-
ered". Examples of such apparently irrelevant "socio-economic conditions"
listed in the guidelines include:
" regional unemployment rates;
" local access to specific jobs;
" the types of major industries in the region;
" the occupational skills needed for those industries;
" the predominant language spoken in the region.
It is not difficult to envision cases in which individual factors compounding a
medical disability will be characterized by HRDC as "socio-economic condi-
tions" rather than personal attributes. Language difficulties, for example, have
often been cited by caseworkers as a factor contributing to a person's disability.
Under the 1995 Disability Policy, it is conceivable that language difficulties
could be rejected as an irrelevant consideration. 23 It will be increasingly import-
ant for caseworkers to relate any non-medical factors to the individual rather
than to his or her community.
Another key change in the 1995 Disability Policy is that it interprets the
"substantially gainful" test as having two elements: profitability and productiv-
ity. The guidelines introduce a formula for assessing profitability of work using
an "SGO benchmark 24 of 25% of the average Year's Maximum Pensionable
Earnings 25 over the three years ending in the year benefits could commence.
23. Indeed, in one recent case, Hammoud v. The Minister of Employment and Immigration
(1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8619, the Board stated bluntly, at 6167, that the appellant's
illiteracy and limited learning skills:
... cannot be considered to be "disabilities" within the meaning of the legislation which
might be considered as entitling her to the benefits of the Act, but rather as literacy or
linguistic "deficiencies" which are irrelevant to the determination of entitlement.
24. SGO is an acronym for "substantially gainful occupation".
25. Hereinafter "the YMPE".
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This parallels the formula used to determine cessation of employment for
retirement pension purposes.26 According to the 1995 Disability Policy, an
individual working to maximum capacity but earning less than the SGO bench-
mark would "normally" be found to be disabled. An individual earning twice
the SGO benchmark or more would be presumed not to be disabled, although
the policy recognizes room for exceptions. An individual earning the SGO
benchmark or more but less than twice the SGO benchmark would have to
present "very strong evidence" to establish eligibility for CPP disability bene-
fits. The policy recognizes that, in some circumstances, there may be profitabil-
ity without productivity, or remuneration without work activity, and that in such
cases, there may in fact be no capacity to work. It should be noted that the old
1989 Disability Policy incorporated a similar formula for determining capacity
to work based on a comparison between actual earnings and the YMPE. The
new guidelines are, however, far more helpful as they offer practical examples
of how the test should be applied.
(b) Rehabilitation and Reassessment
Although the 1995 Disability Policy expressly revokes the 1989 Disability
Policy, it is .not altogether clear that it was intended to be revoked in its entirety.
The 1989 Disability Policy contained guidelines on Reassessments and Reha-
bilitation and other topics in addition to those on disability determination. Some
of these guidelines had already been superseded by policy guidelines released
earlier in 1995, entitled "Removing Work Disincentives: CPP Disability Bene-
fit "/",limination des Contre-Incitations au Travail: Prestation d'Invaliditi du
RPC", but there are some gaps between the 1989 and 1995 documents.
With the new disability determination guidelines now in place, HRDC may
devote more attention in the coming year to improving its processes for reas-
sessment and rehabilitation.
An individual's entitlement to CPP disability benefits is always subject to
reassessment on the basis that he or she can no longer be considered "disabled".
In a large number of cases, the triggering event for a reassessment is the fact
that the individual has advised HRDC that he or she has gone back to work.27
26. In 1995 the SGO was $8559 annually.
27. Sections 68 and 69 of the CPP Regulations require an applicant to provide information
to the Director if so required to determine continuing disability or entitlement to bene-
fits. There is a potential issue as to what constitutes a request for information in this
regard. It is arguable that these sections only refer to specific requirements made "from
time to time" by the Director, and cannot be interpreted broadly so as to encompass any
general obligation to report. However, the standard CPP disability benefit application
form requires applicants to agree in writing to notify the Canada Pension Plan of any
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However, all individuals who appear likely to experience some improvement in
the future are supposed to be flagged for subsequent reassessment at the time
of application. Yet HRDC itself estimates that thousands of reassessments
flagged in this way have in fact not been processed on time because of system
problems.28 The practical result of these internal delays is that many CPP
disability pensioners may wind up facing impossibly large overpayments.
The National Vocational Rehabilitation Project 29 launched in 1993 as a pilot
project to facilitate a return to work by disability pensioners with "rehabilitation
potential" 30 was scheduled to come to an end in March of 1997, and new
referrals in 1996 were limited to short-term rehabilitation initiatives only. In
January 1997, HRDC announced a one-year extension to the program, with no
change in the annual federal funding commitment. 31 The Auditor General's
1996 Report 32 has urged that HRDC consider expanding the scope of its
rehabilitation services to include psycho-social intervention where appropriate
in addition to traditional training and placement services, in order to equitably
serve all disability pensioners. The Auditor General also adverted to one of the
key drawbacks of the NVRP, which has been that participants lose their entitle-
ment to benefits three months after completion of their rehabilitation plan
regardless of whether they are able to find a job, and urged that those who
improvements in their medical condition and of any work which they may undertake.
Further, according to the Report of the Auditor General of Canada, supra, at note 2, the
Ministry has launched a direct mail campaign to advise all CPP disability beneficiaries
that they have a responsibility to report changes in their circumstances. Therefore, if an
individual obtains employment while in receipt of a CPP disability pension, he or she
will normally have an obligation to report the work to the Ministry, and may be subject
to retroactive disentitlement if the work is not reported. It would in all likelihood be the
Ministry's position that these communications constitute ongoing requirements by the
Director under sections 68 and 69 of the CPP Regulations. It is arguably a question of
fact in each case as to whether the standard agreement to report was signed by, brought
to the attention of, or adequately explained to the applicant. It is crucial, too, to bear in
mind that returning to work or attempting a return to work does not in itself mean that
one has ceased to be disabled. Arguments may still be made that the individual is inca-
pable of regularly pursuing substantially gainful employment.
28. Report of the Auditor General of Canada, supra, at note 2.
29. Hereinafter "the NVRP".
30. See R. Ellsworth, et al., "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1994) 10 J.L.
& Social Pol'y at 42-3.
31. Report of the Auditor General of Canada, supra, at note 2; "VRDP Extended One
Year: Ministers Respond to Disability Task Force", Social Policy Update, Vol. III,
Issue 4 (January 28, 1997) at 2.
32. Ibid.
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undertake rehabilitation run no greater risk than those who choose not to. It is
to be hoped that HRDC takes these concerns to heart in the coming year as it
undertakes the task of devising a rehabilitation program to succeed the NVRP
when it expires in 1998.
C. LITIGATION DEVELOPMENTS
1. Disability Benefits - Substantive Issues
There were two recurring themes in disability benefit decisions released by the
PAB this past year. First, there were repeated attempts to chip away at the relevance
and weight of "subjective" factors and evidence in the assessment of disability.
Secondly, there were repeated characterizations of disability as a lifestyle choice,
and of disabled persons as responsible for their own unemployability.
(a) Subjective/objective
Few CPP disability appeals are based solely on medical evidence. Caseworkers
regularly make submissions as to factors other than the degree of actual medical
disability and the Board has often taken such factors into consideration in
deciding whether a person is capable of pursuing employment. The most
common "subjective" factors referred to are age and lack of education or
experience.
However, the PAB now appears to be leaning toward a much more rigid approach
to the determination process. Some decisions released over the past year suggest
that the only relevant evidence in a CPP disability determination is objective
medical evidence. In Brown v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, the
PAB stated:
Whether or not the disability meets both of these rather narrow and rigid
tests ["severe" and "prolonged"] cannot be determined subjectively, but
rather it must be determined objectively on the basis of objective evidence
founded on medically based, clinically established evidence.33
In Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Hastie, the PAB went so far as
to state that:
The phrase "in prescribed manner," appearing in [s. 42(2)(a)], has univer-
sally been interpreted by the Board as meaning founded on credible and
objective medical opinion, as opposed to the subjective evidence of the
appellant.34
33. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8605, at 6137.
34. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8631, at 6187.
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This last statement seems clearly wrong. There is no reason to conclude that "in
prescribed manner" restricts the type of evidence that may be considered in the
determination of disability. It would seem merely a reference to the regulations
which detail the information which a contributor is obliged to submit with an
application for disability benefits. 35
Still, the suggestion that subjective evidence is irrelevant to a determination of
disability seems to be gaining favour at the PAB. This shift in CPP disability
jurisprudence first manifested itself36 in a retreat from the "real world" test
established in the landmark Leduc v. Minister of National Health and Welfare37
case, as to employability of disabled individuals. As anticipated, the PAB is
becoming more and more focussed on strict medical findings.
This past year, in Crossett v. The Minister of Employment and Immigration, the
PAB attempted to further stifle the impact of the Leduc case, by holding that
Leduc and decisions following it were decided in "special and restricted circum-
stances" which should not be expanded. The PAB listed those circumstances as
follows:
(1) a total disability depending on combined conditions both medical and
non-medical and somewhat complicated in nature;
(2) a limitation on the possibility of control of those combined condi-
tions - the difficulty of that control;
(3) a formal restriction on driving an automobile as opposed to voluntary
relinquishment as here;
(4) there being some "unspecified" form of substantial gainful employ-
ment, as opposed to a number of specified gainful employments can-
vassed as here;
(5) an unqualified acceptance of symptoms by certain medical witnesses
and Board members;
(6) a conflict of opinion between medical specialists and the family doc-
tor, with the family doctor being considered in a better position to
assess the applicant. The orthopaedic specialist, Dr. Kruger, and the
family doctor both find partial disability only in the context of
employment;
(7) the consideration of slow learning and learning disability; and
35. See s. 68 of CPP Regulations.
36. As observed last year in Pension Review 1995, supra, note 5, at 22-24.
37. (1988), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8546.
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(8) the disability applicant being well motivated which is not the case
here on the Appellant's own evidence.38
The appellant in Crossett was a 43-year-old labourer with no other work
experience and a grade 10 education who had neck and back pain. Clearly, the
PAB was trying to justify its disregard for the Leduc line of cases in concluding
that he did not meet the CPP test for disability. However, it is very difficult to
read the PAB's list of "circumstances" as a list of significant "special" circum-
stances requiring the application of different legal principles, rather than simply
a list of factual differences between the Leduc case and the case before the PAB.
(b) Conditions within appellant's control
PAB jurisprudence over the past year was also defined by attempts on the part
of some members to lay blame on the disabled for their disabilities. This is not
a new theme by any means. The Board is generally unsympathetic to applicants
whose problems are theoretically within their own control, particularly appli-
cants with diseases which are potentially disabling but are controllable with
medication,3 9 or with addiction problems, such as alcoholism. 40 The PAB has
often given very little consideration to the reality that disability is often a
complex of various inter-related problems, and to the possibility that lack of
motivation for treatment may be a disabling factor in itself. However, the PAB
38. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8618, at 6164.
39. See Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Hapke (1983), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8910,
where the applicant took his medication for arthritis on an intermittent basis only; Min-
ister of National Health and Welfare v. Holmes (1976), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8713, where
the Board took into account the applicant's refusal to take appropriate medication; and
Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Petrollini (1993) C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8517,
where the Board noted the applicant's "casual response and approach to her medical
problems". See also Butt v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1995), C.E.B. &
P.G.R. 8584, where the appellant dairy worker was experiencing severe low back pain,
which prevented her from lifting heavy milk containers. The medical evidence attrib-
uted her back problems to obesity and recommended weight reduction and intensive
exercise. In fact, the appellant had lost about 60 pounds but was still experiencing pain.
The Board held that she could not be considered to be suffering from a severe and pro-
longed disability as she could recover her capacity to engage in gainful employment by
losing more weight.
40. Although the Board does not seem to have directly held that alcoholics are responsible
for their own condition, cases where this has been at issue certainly give an impression
that the Board is not sympathetic to these applicants: e.g., see Minister of National
Health and Welfare v. Glagoloff (1972), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8561; Minister of National
Health and Welfare v. Trainor (1980), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8796; Minister of National
Health and Welfare v. Neary (1974), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8653.
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appears to be denying eligibility in more and more cases on the basis of this sort
of contributory fault principle, arguably without adequate justification.
In 1995, there were some troubling suggestions from the PAB that applicants
with psychological problems should prove that their problems were not within
their control. 41 This past year, there were similar suggestions in other contexts.
In Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Hamou,42 the applicant had
developed chronic pain syndrome after multiple accidents. There was consider-
able medical evidence in the record. Several specialists recommended that the
applicant take rehabilitation counselling. The PAB concluded that he was not
disabled for CPP purposes, primarily on the basis that counselling was never
implemented. The PAB stated:
Respondent has an obligation to engage in this type of therapy, and if it is
not successful, to provide an appropriate explanation.
The PAB did not indicate what sort of "appropriate explanation" it expected the
applicant to provide.
In Feader v. The Minister of Employment and Immigration,43 the appellant, who
was right-handed, had severely injured her right wrist. She was unable to return
to her previous work because of numbness and pain. The PAB found that her
disability did not meet the test of severity, suggesting that the appellant could
increase her residual capacity to work by taking courses to develop her non-
dominant left hand.44
Finally, in the Hastie case, above, the PAB held that the appellant was not
disabled for CPP purposes even though he might be currently incapable of
pursuing any substantially gainful employment, as he could regain the capacity
to work by changing his "very sedentary lifestyle". The PAB concluded that:
... inasmuch as the Respondent's present incapacity is readily remediable
on his own initiative, if he chooses to exercise it, [...] it cannot be said to be
either severe or prolonged within the meaning of the legislation.45
41. See Pension Review 1995, supra at 25-26.
42. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8622.
43. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8615.
44. This decision largely adopted the reasoning in an earlier, but recently-reported Board
decision, Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Vaughan (1992), C.E.B. & P.G.R.
8632.
45. Hastie, supra., note 34, at 6188.
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Decisions such as these set alarming precedents because they inject a highly
speculative element into the determination of whether a person is "capable" of
pursuing a gainful occupation. This, in turn, increases the burden on disability
pension applicants who must not only provide evidence as to their actual
conditions, but also as to the feasibility of self-improvement. Arguably, the more
reasonable approach to assessing the severity of an individual's disability is by
considering the individual's actual capabilities as of the determination date.
Further, while an individual's ability to effect positive lifestyle or treatment
changes may arguably be relevant to the determination as to whether a disability
is "prolonged", the legislative test is whether a disability is "likely to be" long
continued and not whether it could potentially be alleviated by positive action
on the part of the individual. The potential for improvement should be evaluated
on the balance of probabilities, with regard to the person in question and not
some abstract standard of behaviour.
Interestingly, the PAB took a step in that direction this past year, in the evaluation
of depression as a disability. Depression and anxiety are common consequences
of prolonged disability and tend to compound the limitations imposed on the
disabled person. In the past, the PAB has sometimes been reluctant to recognize
consequential depression and anxiety as part of the disability picture.46 This
reluctance is another manifestation of the PAB's tendency to discount disabilities
which are viewed as not being totally beyond the individual's control. This past
year, however, in Minister of Employment and Immigration v. McFadden,4 7 a
majority of the PAB panel rejected the HRDC argument that "endogenous" 48
depression could constitute disability for CPP purposes but depression of a
"reactive" 49 nature could not. The majority stated that disability "cannot be
46. See, for example, Massara v. Minister of National Health and Welfare (1984), C.E.B.
& P.G.R. 8509.
47. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8634.
48. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 5th ed. (Anderson Publishing Co.; 1982) defines
"endogenous depression" as:
... a descriptive syndrome for a cluster of symptoms and features occurring in the
absence of precipitants; e.g. severe d. of mood, psychomotor agitation or retardation,
diurnal mood variation with increased severity in the morning, early morning awaken-
ing and insomnia in the middle of the night, weight loss, self-reproach or guilt, and lack
of reactivity to one's environment.
49. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, ibid., defines "reactive depression" as:
a psychotic state occasioned directly by an intensely sad external situation (fre-
quently loss of a loved person), relieved by the removal of the external situation (e.g.
reunion with a loved person).
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determined by reference to a narrow dichotomy of that nature" and emphasized
that the governing criteria are the statutory criteria. 50 In that case, the appellant
had essentially dropped out of society after becoming increasingly unable to
cope with the restrictive nature of his factory job.
2. Disability Benefits - Procedural Issues
(a) Late applications
The introduction of the "late application rule" in 1992 has opened new doors
for applicants who had previously been shut out because of their inability to
meet contributory requirements through the passage of time.5 1 However, this
new avenue to eligibility has also created a new set of problems for advocates.
Numerous cases have been lost because of procedural complications and uncer-
tainty as to the operation of the "late application rule" rather than on the actual
merits.
The "late application rule" is contained in section 44(l)(b)(iv) of the CPP, which
states that a disability pension is payable to:
... a contributor to whom a disability pension would have been payable at
the time the contributor is deemed to have become disabled had an applica-
tion for a disability pension been received prior to the time the contributor's
application for a disability pension was actually received.
This section has not yet produced enough caselaw to resolve the many unan-
swered questions raised by its convoluted and ambiguous language. In the words
of one PAB member, McQuaid J.:
[T]he Minister might give some serious thought to the draftsmanship of
Section 44(1)(b)(iv). Otherwise it promises to be fertile field for future con-
tention.52
However, potential problems are becoming easier to flag. According to policy
directives, HRDC's standard approach in processing a late application is to
determine the latest date on which the applicant could have applied for disability
benefits and met the contributory requirements then in effect. HRDC then
50. "A severe and prolonged mental or physical disability".
51. For an overview of the "late application rule", see H. Beatty, "Applied 'Too Late' for
CPP Disability? You May Have a Second Chance (Thanks to Bill C-57)", (September
1992) The L.A.V.G.O. Reporting Service, Vol. 6:3 at 19. Harry Beatty is a staff lawyer at
ARCH (Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped) in Toronto.
52. Minister of Human Resources Development v. Andryjowich (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R.
8639.
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proceeds to consider whether the applicant was disabled on that date, and, if so,
the late application succeeds. 53 In practice, the HRDC approach is no doubt
much more efficient administratively, as it avoids the need for time-consuming
disability determinations in all cases. It is also consistent to some extent with
HRDC's practice in dealing with timely applications, which are also screened
for contributory requirements before a disability assessment is undertaken.
However, this approach is arguably the reverse of what is contemplated in the
legislation. The eligibility provisions define an applicant's contributory period
by reference to his or her actual or deemed disability date, and therefore seem
to require that the date of disability be set before an assessment of contributions
and contributory requirements is made. Further, HRDC's approach to processing
late applications is not in the best interests of all applicants, and some applicants
may wind up with reduced pensions or falling through the cracks altogether, as
a result of inappropriately strict adherence to policy in this context. The late
application rule provides for the setting of a notional application date. Arguably,
the governing principle should be that this date should be set so as to maximize
the benefits payable to the late applicant, assuming that the test of disability can
be met. Nothing in the legislation requires that it be set as late as possible, as
the HRDC policy suggests.
The most common problem with the HRDC approach is that a late applicant's
disability date will normally be set as of the date when he or she last met
contributory requirements even if the actual onset of disability was much earlier.
As a general rule, the sooner a contributor's contributory period ends, the larger
the earnings-related portion of his or her disability pension will be. In cases
where an earlier disability date would result in a higher pension for a client, it
may be worth making the argument that the standard HRDC approach to late
applications is inappropriate and that the client's contributory period should be
closed as of the actual disability onset date and not as of the date when
contributory requirements were last met.
53. C-57 Quick Reference Guide, an internal undated document obtained from the Ministry
in 1993, states:
When reviewing an application under Bill C-57, the question that must be answered is:
What is the latest date (year and month) that this individual could have
applied for a disability benefit and met the contributory requirements
applicable at that time?
The Guide goes on to state that "the starting point for calculating the minimum qualify-
ing period is the last year with valid contributions".
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Difficulties may also arise in determining how the late application rule interacts
with the disability deeming provision in section 42(2)(b). 54 The basic rule is that
an applicant's contributory period ends at the date of onset of disability, except
that the onset date may be set no earlier than 15 months prior to the date of
application. The contributory requirements which the applicant must meet are
determined by the legislation in effect at the date of application. In a typical
timely application, HRDC determines whether contributory requirements were
met on the earliest possible date for disability onset, 15 months prior to the date
of application, and, if so, proceeds to make a disability determination. In a
typical late application, the 15-month window is not factored into the determi-
nation of eligibility, and HRDC simply determines whether the applicant was
disabled as of the last date when contributory requirements were met. However, the
15-month window may be critical to the success of some late applications. We are
aware of one case in which a person became disabled in late 1985, after having
contributed to the CPP from 1982 through 1985, but was refused benefits on a late
application in 1992, apparently on the basis that the "two out of three" rule 55 was
not yet in effect in his last year of valid contributions. Had this person made a timely
application in early 1987 after the introduction of the "two out of three" contribution
rule, he would have been found eligible. As a result of the 15-month window, his
contributory period could still be closed off in 1985. Arguably, HRDC could and
should have used the same approach in dealing with the late application. The
notional application date could have been fixed up to 15 months after the end of
the last year of valid contributions by factoring in the deemed disability window.
In situations like this, it is very important to return to the actual statutory
language and to point out the potential arbitrariness of policy-driven decisions.
(b) The resjudicata roadblock
Given the flexibility of the "late application rule", and the uncertainty surround-
ing its operation, it may be tempting to rely on it in every case involving a claim
54. Section 42(2)(b) of the CPP provides:
a person shall be deemed to have become ... disabled at such time as is determined
in prescribed manner to be the time when he became ... disabled, but in no case
shall a person be deemed to have become disabled earlier than fifteen months
before the time of the making of any application in respect of which the
determination is made.
55. As of January 1987, a contributor who does not meet the minimum qualifying period
test can still be eligible for a pension if he or she has made contributions for at least two
of the last three years in his or her contributory period. If there are only two years in
that contributory period, he or she must have made contributions for both of those
years: see sections 44(l)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the CPP.
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to past benefits. However, two 1996 decisions of the PAB point out some of the
pitfalls of invoking the "late application rule" as a matter of course, especially
where there have been prior unsuccessful applications.
In Minister of Human Resources Development v. Andryjowich5 6 and LeBlanc v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration,57 the PAB dismissed appeals by late
applicants, stating that the "late application rule" does not permit the revival of
a prior timely application which has already been denied, as this would amount
to a "revisiting of the very issue" previously dealt with, contrary to the doctrine
of resjudicata. In principle, this proposition is valid. 58 However, the way in
which it has been applied by the PAB gives some cause for concern.
In the Andryjowich case, the respondent stopped working in 1979 because of
neck and back pain but did not apply for CPP disability benefits until 1988. His
application was denied on the basis of insufficient earnings and contributions
and an appeal to a Review Committee was unsuccessful. In June 1992, after the
introduction of the "late application rule", he re-applied. The Mvinister denied
this application on the basis of insufficient contributions, and because the
respondent had been in receipt of a retirement pension since 1990. The respon-
dent appealed to a Review Tribunal, which found in his favour and determined
that he had become disabled in August 1987. The Ministry successfully appealed
to the PAB. The PAB held that the Review Tribunal had acted without jurisdic-
tion, apparently because it had considered the "late application rule" in making
its decision. 59 The PAB also interpreted the Review Tribunal's decision as using
the "late application rule" to reinstate the respondent's unsuccessful 1988
application, which it held was unreasonable. The PAB stated that the determina-
tion of the respondent's 1988 application was resjudicata. This is a disturbing
decision, particularly because the PAB did not explore the possibility that the
"late application rule" might still be of assistance to the respondent. As the
obstacle to eligibility in this case was contributions and not disability, it is quite
possible that the respondent could have been eligible had the PAB set a notional
application date for the purposes of the "late application rule" prior to 1988.
Arguably, it was in precisely this type of situation that the "late application rule"
was intended to apply.
56. Supra., note 52.
57. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8637.
58. See, generally, discussion of res judicata and issue estoppel in Rasanen v Rosemount
Instruments Ltd. (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 267 (C.A.).
59. This finding in itself is open to challenge. The "late application rule" is one element of
the test for eligibility. The Review Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine whether the
respondent was eligible for benefits: ss. 82, 84 of the CPP.
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In LeBlanc, released shortly after Andryjowich, the appellant was injured in
1983 and first applied for CPP disability benefits in March 1986. The applica-
tion was refused on medical grounds and was not appealed. In 1990, the
appellant attempted a brief return to work but was re-injured after several
months. In 1993, she re-applied for CPP disability benefits, and was again
refused. However, this time, she appealed the refusal. In keeping with HRDC
policy, the PAB determined that the appellant could not qualify from a contrib-
utory standpoint after September 1986, and held that she could therefore only
succeed by relying on the "late application rule". The PAB concluded that this
would require a reconsideration of the issue determined on the first application
in 1986, and that this was barred by resjudicata. The appellant in this case was
unrepresented. It is arguable that she might have had a better chance of success
if she had instead pursued an application for reconsideration on the basis of new
facts. 60 It seems clear that the "late application rule" was intended to prevent
applicants from losing eligibility over time because of insufficient contributions,
not to permit a second determination as to disability at the same point in time.61
There was a third significant decision this past year involving the doctrine of
res judicata. In Headlam v. Minister of Employment and Immigration,6 2 the
appellant first applied for disability benefits in 1985. Benefits were denied on
the basis that she was not considered to be disabled. She re-applied in 1988 and
benefits were again denied by both the Minister and a Review Committee. In
1991, leave to appeal to the PAB was also denied. In 1993, the appellant applied
for a third time, and again her application was denied, but this time she obtained
leave to appeal to the PAB. However, the PAB held that the issue of the
appellant's entitlement to disability benefits was res judicata as it had been
60. Section 84(2) of the CPP.
61. A complicating feature of this case was that the appellant did make a return to work for
several months in 1990. The PAB found that this fact in itself precluded her from suc-
ceeding under the "late application rule". The PAB stated, at 6200:
In my view, that provision is only available to an applicant who was disabled
while meeting the contributory requirements of the Plan and who has
continuously been disabled up to the date of the application for benefits...
or at least to the date at which in light of section 42(2)(b) and 69 of the Plan,
benefits would be payable (that is, 12 months before the application was made).
This in itself is a troubling finding, as it implies that an applicant can only rely on the
late application rule if he or she continues to suffer from the same disability at the time
of actual application. This operates to prevent an applicant from claiming for a "closed"
period of disability in the past.
62. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8638.
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finally determined by the PAB in 1991. The PAB held that there were no new
facts, and, if there had been, the appellant would have to apply to the Review
Committee that heard the matter in first instance. The PAB relied on an earlier
decision, MacIsaac v. Minister of Employment and Immigration,63 in which the
PAB had properly held that a finally determined application was subject to the
rules of resjudicata and could not be revived by a subsequent application unless
the application was clearly for reconsideration on the basis of "new facts" under
section 84(2).64 There was, however, a key difference between MacIsaac and
Headlam. In the former case, the appellant was seeking to overturn a prior final
decision of the PAB, whereas in the latter case, the appellant appeared to be
exercising a valid right of appeal to the PAB from a Review Committee decision
on a re-application at a later date. In the Headlam case, the fundamental problem
was that the appellant apparently had no new evidence to differentiate her
application in 1993 from her application in 1988. An appellant is only expressly
required to show "new facts" to obtain rescission or amendment of a prior
decision by the same tribunal under section 84(2) of the CPP. That said, it would
be highly unusual for the PAB to reach a different result on eligibility on a
re-application without any new evidence demonstrating a deterioration in the
appellant's medical condition or other relevant change in circumstances.
Although the PAB may have reached the right result on the evidence in Headlam
in finding that the appellant was not disabled, its conclusion that the prior
determination as to disability was resjudicata was questionable. A finding that
the appellant was not disabled in 1988 should not, in itself, bar a finding that
the appellant was disabled in 1993. Although the circumstances in Headlam may
have been such that the appellant was in fact trying to re-open substantially the
same issue, the application of res judicata in the context of disability assess-
ments at different times should rarely be justified. It is worth noting that Walker
J.A. expressed this same concern and caution in a concurring judgment in
Headlam, indicating that he preferred to base his decision on the lack of evidence
of disability rather than on the operation of resjudicata. Interestingly, just a few
weeks later, Walker J.A. concurred in the judgment in Andryjowich, above,
without similar exhortations.
These three decisions suggest that the PAB and Review Tribunals may be
increasingly inclined to dismiss re-applications in a summary way by invoking
63. (1994), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8570.
64. Section 84(2) of the CPP provides:
The Minister, a Review Tribunal or the Pension Appeals Board may, notwith-
standing subsection (1), on new facts, rescind or amend a decision under
this Act given by him, the Tribunal or the Board, as the case may be.
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resjudicata. Advocates may be able to avoid a hostile reception at the PAB by
highlighting evidential differences between the re-application and prior appli-
cations, by considering a reconsideration on new facts where appropriate, and
by preparing arguments to meet the resjudicata issue if it is raised.
3. Charter Challenges
The contributory requirements under section 44 of the CPP and the effect of the
"deemed disability" provision in section 42(2)(b) on eligibility are unique to the
disability pension scheme within the CPP. It is arguable that these provisions
are discriminatory, contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, as they impose a disadvantage on disabled contributors not imposed
on other contributors to the CPP. Only disabled contributors are subject to a
recency test in that their contributions must have been made within a certain
time frame. Only disabled contributors have their contributory period deter-
mined on the basis of a "deemed" event (deemed disability date) rather than an
actual event (such as retirement, age, death etc.).
Undaunted by rejection at the PAB, advocates continue to work on Charter
challenges to the CPP disability provisions, looking for a chink in the wall. This
past year, another challenge had its day in court. In Xinos v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration6 5, the appellant had made CPP contributions
from 1966 to 1978, but had not been in Canada between 1979 and 1988. Shortly
after returning to work in Canada in 1989, he was injured. He was denied
benefits on the basis that he did not meet minimum contributory requirements.
The Charter challenge here focussed on the recency test and section 15 of
the Charter. The PAB dismissed the appeal, holding that while retirement
benefits were available to all contributors who met basic requirements,
whether disabled or not, disability benefits were additional benefits avail-
able only to the disabled, and therefore the view that the disabled were
disadvantaged by the benefit scheme could not be supported. In the
alternative, the PAB held that any violation of section 15 would be saved
by section 1 as the different policy objectives for retirement and disability
pensions justified different contributory requirements. An application to the
Federal Court of Appeal for judicial review of this decision was dismissed orally
in March of 1997.66
65. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8609. The appellant in Xinos was represented by Injured
Workers' Consultants in Toronto.
66. Xinos v The Attorney General of Canada and The Minister of Employment and
Immigration, (March 19, 1997), #A-212-96 (Fed. C.A.) [unreported].
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There had been at least three previous Charter challenges to the CPP disability
provisions at the PAB. In Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Kartisch,67
the applicant was disabled by asbestosis. He had made CPP contributions
between 1966 and 1976 but had not worked since 1978. He applied for CPP
disability benefits in 1985 and 1986, but was denied on the basis that he did not
meet the minimum contribution requirements because the earliest he could be
deemed to be disabled was October 1984. The PAB heard argument only on the
issue of whether the deemed disability rule violated section 7 of the Charter.
The PAB rejected the challenge, holding first that there was no deprivation under
section 7 as section 7 did not protect economic or property rights, and, secondly,
that if there was a deprivation, it was not contrary to fundamental justice as the
deemed disability rule:
... allows disability to be consistently and accurately established on a retro-
active basis and for a reasonable period.
Again, in Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Johnston,68 the applicant
was denied a disability pension on the basis of insufficient contributions. The
applicant in this case challenged the contributory requirement provisions under
section 15 of the Charter, arguing that they were more onerous than the
requirements for eligibility for retirement, death, survivor's or orphan's benefits
under the CPP. The PAB rejected the challenge, holding that, while the CPP was
an omnibus plan, it encompassed two separate schemes, one based on compul-
sory savings (retirement/survivor's benefits) and the other a quasi-insurance
scheme (disability benefits), and that the fundamental difference between the
schemes required different eligibility criteria. In Minister of National Health
and Welfare v. Sinclair,69 the applicant challenged the disability pension eligi-
bility criteria under both section 7 and section 15 of the Charter. In that case,
the applicant had applied for disability benefits in May of 1987. She had made
valid contributions to the CPP in 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1972 to 1978.
However, because of the operation of the deemed disability rule, the earliest her
contributory period could end was May of 1986. She did not therefore meet
minimum contributory requirements. The PAB adopted the reasoning in
Kartisch, above, in rejecting the section 7 challenge, and adopted the reasoning
in Johnston, above, in rejecting the section 15 challenge.
67. (1991), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8625.
68. (1991), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 9214.
69. (1992), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8501.
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3. Pension Credit-Splitting
The CPP provides a mechanism whereby pensionable earnings accumulated
during a marriage or spousal relationship defined in the legislation may be
divided equally between the former spouses on divorce or separation. This
process, which is commonly referred to as "pension credit-splitting", results in
a benefit to the person who had the lowest pensionable earnings during the
cohabitation period, as pensionable earnings form the basis for determining a
person's entitlement to CPP retirement and disability benefits. 70 Some of the
murky areas of the pension credit-splitting provisions received some much-
needed clarification this past year with the release of the Minister of Employment
and Immigration v. Neil and Roy71 decision. Neil contains a useful review of the
pension credit-splitting process and the role of the Minister's discretion under
section 55.1(5) in particular.72 In that case, the respondent husband and inter-
venor wife had been married in 1971, had separated in 1988, and had divorced
in 1989. They had agreed in a settlement not to apply for a division of unadjusted
pensionable earnings. 73 In 1992, the intervenor attended a Ministry office to
obtain information and, while there, completed a DUPE form. The Minister
received the form and went ahead with a DUPE.74 The evidence demonstrated
that the DUPE had the net effect of reducing the respondent's monthly CPP
payments and increasing the intervenor's pension credits. The respondent
appealed and won before a Review Tribunal. At the PAB hearing, the Minister
presented evidence that, even prior to 1995 amendments to section 55.1(5),75 it
70. A "contributor" is defined in s. 2 of the CPP as including a person who receives a divi-
sion of pension credits. It is therefore possible for a person who was previously ineligi-
ble as a non-contributor to gain eligibility as a "contributor" by applying for a division
of pension credits.
71. (1995), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8590.
72. Section 55.1(5) of the CPP provides:
Before a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings is made under this section, or
within the prescribed period after such a division is made, the Minister may refuse to
make the division or may cancel the division, as the case may be, if the Minister is sat-
isfied that
(a) benefits are payable to or in respect of both spouses or former spouses; and
(b) the amount of both benefits decreased at the time the division was
made or would decrease at the time the division was proposed to be made.
73. Hereinafter "DUPE".
74. In accordance with the mandatory division provision in section 55.1(1)(a) of the CPP.
75. Until July 1995, the Minister had a residual discretion to refuse a DUPE or cancel a
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was policy to consider only monetary factors in determining whether there was
detriment to both spouses. The Minister indicated that it is possible, although
rarely so, for a division to be financially detrimental to both spouses. The
respondent and intervenor both argued that other criteria should factor into a
determination of detriment: the wishes of the parties as expressed in their
spousal agreement, the risk of one spouse being exposed to costly enforcement
litigation, and the possible introduction of acrimonious relations between the
former spouses. Without expressly accepting the Minister's interpretation of
"detriment", the PAB allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that, even enlarging
the inquiry beyond monetary factors, a case for detriment to both spouses had
not been made out.
In Neil, the PAB also expressly held that:
... the 60-day prescribed period for cancelling a decision applies only to the
Minister acting on his own motion pursuant to section 55.1(5) and not to
decisions made in respect of regular appeals. 76
Finally, in Neil, the PAB also clarified that its jurisdiction to review a refusal by
the Minister to cancel a DUPE under section 55.1(5) flows from the general
right to appeal a section 55.1 decision,77 stating:
It is noted that any decision under 55.1 is subjected to appellate review
without limitation. Since subsection 55.1(5) of general section 55.1 is not
excluded, ministerial decisions made thereunder are therefore appealable,
including a decision that the division of pension credits is not detrimental to
both spouses.7 8
This proposition, which marked a departure from the traditional PAB view that
it has no jurisdiction to interfere with or compel the exercise of Ministerial
discretion, 7 9 was echoed in Doherty v The Minister of Employment and
Immigration,80 a case involving the incapacity provisions in section 55.3,81
DUPE within 60 days of the order if satisfied that the division would be "to the detri-
ment of both spouses or former spouses". The provision is now much more specific.
76. Neil, supra, note 70, at 6112. This holding was consistent with the decision in Minister
of National Health and Welfare v. Bidon (1994), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8535.
77. Section 81 of the CPP.
78. Neil, supra, note 70, at 6112. The emphasis appears in the original decision.
79. See Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Benovich (1993), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8510
and O'Brien v. Minister of National Health and Welfare (1993), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8519.
80. (1996), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8651.
81. The Minister may deem an application for a DUPE to have been made at an earlier date
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several months later. In Doherty, the PAB properly recognized that while section
55.3 confers a discretion on the Minister, a decision made under that section was
a decision subject to appeal under section 81, and the Review Tribunal's decision
to decline jurisdiction over the matter was wrong in law.
The appellant in the Doherty case had applied for a DUPE almost 10 years after
her divorce in July 1981. The evidence showed she had been a victim of
longstanding physical abuse in her marriage of more than 30 years and had been
traumatized by the divorce. She was aware of her right to seek a DUPE but was
intimidated by the prospect and was unable to bring herself to do so until after
her former husband's death. The PAB held that the medical evidence did not
support a finding that the appellant was incapable of forming or expressing the
intent to seek a DUPE, but acknowledged that this did not mean:
... that the fear of spousal retribution could never operate to create an inca-
pacity to form the requisite intention. 82
The PAB held that the appellant was not incapable of pursuing her rights but
rather "felt dissuaded" from doing so. Clearly, this is a tenuous distinction in
cases involving family abuse.
D. REFORMING THE CANADA PENSION PLAN
An attempt to reform the CPP was one of the major social policy initiatives
undertaken by the federal, provincial and territorial governments over the past
year. The first indication that such reform was going to be more than the usual
five year review of the CPP contribution rates (which is mandated by the
legislation 83) was the federal budget in 1995. At that time, federal Finance
Minister Paul Martin stated:
Canadian seniors deserve to know that those public pensions will be there
for them. That in turn requires reform to ensure that the pension system is
sustainable in the long term. 84
Martin indicated at that time that a discussion paper on the pension system would
be forthcoming, and that its focus would be "fairness and sustainability". 85
in the event of incapacity on the part of the applicant: section 55.3 of the CPP. See also
general provisions on incapacity in section 60.
82. Doherty, supra, at 6233.
83. Section 113.1 of the CPP.
84. Paul Martin, Budget Speech (1995) (February 27, 1995) at 20.
85. Ibid.
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It was to be over a year before the discussion paper on the CPP was finally
released. Entitled "An Information Paper for Consultations on the Canada
Pension Plan",86 it was to serve as the starting point for consultations with
Canadians around changing the CPP. It was released at a time when the public
viewed the CPP with increasing pessimism. Concern had been expressed about
such things as the rising contribution rates, the CPP's "unfunded liability", the
fact that the CPP was going broke and the impact that members of the baby
boom generation would have upon the CPP when they all retire. 87
The CPP provides universal coverage for all employed and self-employed
people earning above an annual minimum amount, it is fully portable, it
immediately vests with the contributor, the benefits it provides are fully indexed
to inflation and, due to the large size of the Plan, it has significant economies of
scale for administrative expenses. Further, with respect to eligibility for the
disability benefits provided, there are no differential contribution rates or
exclusions from coverage based on the personal health or the disability history
of the contributor.88 In fact, the CPP is one of the least understood income
maintenance programs in Canada89 and the CPP Paper did little to redress this
problem.
1. The Consultation Process
The consultation process itself was disappointing, to say the least. The federal,
provincial and territorial finance ministers announced the release of the CPP
Paper on February 9, 1996, and confirmed that there would be cross-country
hearings.90 However, there was very little public information available on where
86. Released by the federal, provincial and territorial governments of Canida, (February
1996) [hereinafter CPP Paper].
87. See for example, A. Freeman, "Canada Pension going broke", The Globe and Mail (25
February, 1995) B1, "75% of Canadians distrust security of CPP, poll shows", The
Globe and Mail (6 October, 1995) B4 and J. Simpson, "The longer the pension crisis
remains unsolved, the worse it gets", The Globe and Mail (10 January, 1996) A12.
88. Canadian Institute of Actuaries, "Canadian Retirement Income Social Security Pro-
grams: Report of the Task Force on Social Security Financing" (November, 1993) at 10
and "The Future of the Canada Pension Plan: Ensuring Fairness and Opportunity for
Persons with Disabilities", a brief submitted by the Council of Canadians with Disabili-
ties to the CPP Consultation session held in Toronto on April 15, 1996 (at 3).
89. See for example, Canada Pension Plan Advisory Board, Extending the Level of Pension
Awareness in Canada (Ottawa, 1993) at 11-12 and Report of the Auditor General of
Canada to the House of Commons, (Ottawa, 1993) at 490-491.
90. A. Freeman, "Lower benefits studied for pensions", The Globe and Mail (10 February,
1996) Al.
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and how to acquire copies of the discussion paper and the discussion paper itself
was not publicly available for more than a week after its "release". The 1-800
number which was established to allow Canadians to access information about
the consultation process was advertised on only a handful of occasions. Further,
more than a month after the release of the CPP Paper, no information on the
form of the consultation process was available. By the end of March, 1996 it
was revealed that the consultation process would begin by mid-April and would
last for approximately six weeks, but there was no information as to who would
conduct the consultations, where they would take place, when they would take
place or how they would take place. There was not even any process for
organizations and individuals to place their names on a contact list so that such
information could be distributed when it became available. Callers to the 1-800
number were told that they might check back in a week or two to see if any
further information was available. 91
The public hearings which were finally conducted were chaired by David
Walker, a federal Liberal MP from Winnipeg. Generally, two MPP's from the
province in which the hearings were being conducted also sat on the panel. The
hearings featured a combination of brief presentations and a roundtable discus-
sion amongst the participants. Participants were selected by the CPP Consulta-
tion Secretariat in order to ensure a "balance" of opinions.92
2. The CPP Paper
The CPP Paper contained a brief overview of the history of the CPP and a
review of the issues giving rise to the need for reform. It was explained that the
growth of the "cost" of the CPP had exceeded the growth of the rate of
contributions to the CPP. This was because of changing demographics, 93
91. These observations are based on the author's calls to the 1-800 number and discussions
with people at the CPP Consultation Secretariat, which was established to oversee the pro-
cess.
92. At the hearing which Randall Ellsworth attended in Toronto, there was also an open micro-
phone available for members of the audience to participate with questions and observations.
Even on the actual day of the hearings, many of the audience members expressed concern
that they had heard nothing about the hearings until that same morning. Even some of the
participants had not had their participation confirmed until that morning.
93. For example, people are living longer and therefore retirement benefits are payable for
a longer period of time and fewer Canadians are actually in the work force, which
means those who are will be required to pay more in contributions in order to support
the increasing number of pensioners. See CPP Paper at 20-2 1.
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changing economics, 94 benefit enrichments95 and increases in the amount and
duration of disability benefits. 96
With no changes to the CPP, the contribution rate was anticipated to rise to
14.2% of covered earnings in 2030, which was considered unacceptable. 97 The
CPP Paper proposed changes under two headings: strengthening financing and
reducing costs (i.e., benefits).
(a) Strengthening Financing98
In short, this meant raising the contribution rates by some amount. The amount
that the contribution rates would be raised could be reduced if action was also
taken to reduce the costs of the CPP. The CPP Paper advocated an acceleration
of the contribution rates to 12.2 per cent by the year 2002. (This rate would be
reduced to 10.9 per cent if there was a 10 per cent reduction in benefits and to
10.3 per cent if there was a 15 per cent reduction in benefits.) 99 This was referred
to as the "steady state" rate, meaning that once it was reached, it would never
have to be altered to keep the plan financially sound. The justification for this
proposed "steady state" rate was twofold: it would place more of the financial
burden of maintaining the plan on present contributors and ensure that they
would pay a greater share of the benefits they would receive and it would result
in a larger reserve fund of approximately 6 years' worth of benefits (which would
94. Slower growth in the number of people in the labour force and in labour force produc-
tivity resulted in a slower growth in salary and wages. Thus rapid contribution rate
increases were necessary to compensate for this slower growth in the contribution base.
See CPP Paper at 22-23.
95. These included the full indexation of benefits, expansion of the eligiblity for survivor's
benefits and the introduction of the child rearing drop-out provision which allowed
Canadians who had lessened or terminated their attachment to the labour force in order
to care for children under the age of 7 to protect their entitlements under the CPP. See
CPP Paper at 23-24.
96. CPP Paper at 24.
97. The year 2030 was presumably chosen as being the year in which all the "baby boom-
ers" would have retired; i.e., 65 years after 1965 which is assumed to be the last year of
the "baby boom". The contribution rate of 14.2% would be the "pay as you go rate";
that is, contributions would have to equal 14.2% of covered earnings in order to cover
expenditures (benefits) under the CPP in that year.
98. For a more detailed discussion of the history of financing the Canada Pension Plan see
R. Ellsworth, "Reforming the Canada Pension Plan: The Search for Fairness and
Sustainability...but for Whom? ', (April 1996) The LA. V.G.O. Reporting Service Vol.
10:3 at 17.
99. CPP Paper at 28-29.
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produce greater investment earnings and thus remove the necessity to have a
higher contribution rate). 100
The CPP Paper also proposed freezing, reducing or eliminating the year's basic
exemption (YBE). At present, no contributions are made by either an employer
or an employee on the first $3500 of an employee's earnings.1 01 Freezing,
removing or reducing the YBE would mean that low income earners would have
to pay an even larger share of their income as CPP contributions, although it
would expand the number of people who would be eligible for benefits. It would
also increase the total amount of contributions to the CPP and reduce the need
for an increase in the level of the contributory rate. 102
(b) Reducing Costs (Benefits)
Not surprisingly, the majority of the recommendations for reducing the payment
of benefits under the CPP focussed on the retirement and disability pensions,
as combined these benefits account for more than 80% of expenditures under
the CPP. 103
(i) Retirement Pensions
The biggest concern with respect to the rising cost associated with the retirement
pension was the increasing life expectancy of recipients. On average, people
were living 3.1 years longer now than when the CPP was introduced in 1966,
which resulted in a benefit payout for a longer period of time. Proposals for
reducing the payments under this heading included reducing the amount of the
retirement pension for new retirees, 10 4 reducing the "low earnings dropout",10 5
100. Ibid. at 27-28. At present, the reserve fund is equal to approximately two years of bene-
fits.
101. This is an implicit subsidization of low income earners by high income earners, because
CPP benefits are calculated on a person's full level of income, and not just the amount
of income upon which contributions are made.
102. CPP Paper at 30-31. The discussion paper does suggest that the YBE might be
replaced by a tax credit through the income tax system to ease the burden on low
income earners.
103. Retirement pensions accounted for approximately 62% of expenditures in 1996, while
disability payments accounted for 19%; see CPP Paper at 12-13. The CPP Paper also
contained a proposal for eliminating the death benefit (at 41). With respect to survivor's
benefits it was stated that "fundamental reform would be complex and time consuming",
and the review of these benefits was to continue over the next one or two years (at 40).
104. Ibid., at 34. At present the benefit rate for retirement pensions is 25% of a contributor's
average pensionable earnings. The CPP Paper proposed reducing this amount to
22.5%.
105. Ibid., at 34-35. At present, any contributor who has contributed for more than ten years
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raising the age of retirement 10 6 and only partially indexing retirement pensions
to the rate of inflation. 107
(ii) Disability pensions
The CPP Paper contained several recommendations which were directed solely
at disabled applicants and recipients. The first was changing the eligibility
period to qualify for CPP disability benefits. At present, a person can be eligible
for a disability pension if he or she has contributed to the Plan in two out of the
last three years. The discussion paper proposes changing this to four out of the
last six years in order to ensure a greater "attachment" to the labour force (i.e.,
higher contributions) although it does acknowledge that this would result in less
"attachment" to the CPP (i.e., fewer people eligible). 10 8
The CPP Paper also contains two proposals which deal with the interaction of
the disability pension and the retirement pension. Presently, a disabled recipient
receives his or her full retirement pension when he or she turns sixty five. One
proposal suggests that disabled recipients should only receive an actuarially
reduced retirement benefit, similar to the benefit payable to those who have
can drop out up to 15 per cent of his or her lowest income or non-working years for the
purposes of calculating his or her pension entitlement (up to a maximum of seven
years). This provision is of assistance to those who start their working careers late
because of schooling or who have their careers interrupted by periods of unemployment
(such as recipients of social assistance, employment insurance or workers' compensa-
tion payments, who cannot contribute to the CPP). A reduction in this drop-out would
result in many people receiving lower CPP benefits.
106. Ibid., at 35-36. The CPP Paper proposed raising the retirement age (and thus eligibility
for a pension) to 66 or 67 from 65. This change would be phased in gradually, over five
to ten years, in order to give those affected an opportunity to adjust their financial
affairs. The discussion paper did recognize that some of the "savings" associated with
this change would be offset by the necessity of having to pay CPP disability benefits
for a longer period of time; i.e., until the disability recipient turned 67. However,
another difficulty with the proposal is that such a change in the retirement age would be
in direct conflict with people's employment choices, as more people are choosing to
retire before the age of 65; see Statistics Canada, Canada's Changing Retirement Pat-
terns (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 1996) at 16-17.
107. CPP Paper at 36-37. The paper contained two proposals for deindexing pensions. The
first was to limit the indexation of all present and future retirees' pensions to the rate of
inflation minus 1 per cent. It was recognized that this approach would have the greatest
detrimental effect on those who relied upon the CPP longest (in most cases, this would
be women). The second proposal was to limit the partial indexation to a specific period
of time (i.e., the next ten years) so that people receiving their retirement pensions dur-
ing that time period would be making some contribution to "lessening the burden" on
younger generations.
108. Ibid., at 38.
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taken early retirement.1 0 9 The second proposal involved basing a disabled
recipient's retirement pension on the average wage at the time he or she became
disabled (rather than at the time he or she turned 65).110
(iii) Drop-out provisions
Along with removing the "low earnings dropout"'111 it was also suggested that
the "disability dropout" be reduced or limited. At present, every year in which
a person is in receipt of a CPP disability benefit is excluded from the calculation
of that person's retirement pension. The CPP Paper questioned whether only a
partial "dropout" should be allowed and whether the combination of the "low
earnings dropout" and the "disability dropout" should continue to be allowed. 112
In either case, prohibiting the application of the "disability dropout" would
amount to penalizing a person simply for being disabled.
3. Report on the Consultation Process
At the end of the consultation process a report was released which was,
essentially, a synopsis of what was heard during the public hearings. 113 The main
"themes" which emerged during the consultation included the following:
a) Canadians wanted the CPP preserved and protected as an important part
of the retirement income system;
b) the CPP should remain a public pension plan and should not be privat-
ized;
c) at present there is a lack of confidence in the CPP, and Canadians want
measures to be adopted to restore that confidence;
d) Canadians have misunderstood the CPP and action should be taken to
ensure that they are better informed; 114 and
109. Ibid., at 39-40. This suggestion would equate people who voluntary retire (and thus
voluntarily accept a reduced retirement pension) with those who are forced out of the
work force by reason of disability.
110. Ibid., at 39. In this way the purchasing power of a disabled recipient's retirement pen-
sion would be frozen at the level it was at when the person became disabled. The CPP
Paper suggests that this would more closely tie the retirement pension's value to the
work history of the disabled recipient.
111. Supra., note 105.
112. Ibid., at 40.
113. Federal/ProvincialTerritorial CPP Consultation Secretariat, Report on the Canada Pen-
sion Plan Consultations (June, 1996).
114. Ibid., at 13-20.
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e) compensation for disability should be removed as a benefit under the
CPP.115
4. Alternative Proposals
The CPP Paper's proposals were by no means the only proposals for amending
the Canada Pension Plan to deal with the changing demographic, fiscal and
economic situation. In June of 1996 the Quebec government released its own
discussion paper on the Quebec Pension Plan ("the Qpp,,).ll6 The Quebec
discussion proposed raising the contribution rates under the QPP to 10.2 per
cent by the year 2004 instead of other options, such as raising the retirement
age, reducing benefits and removing inflation protection from benefits. 117
The National Council of Welfare also released its own critique of the federal/pro-
vincial/territorial proposals for reforming the Cpp.118 This critique included the
support for a gradual (rather than sudden) increase in the CPP contribution rates
and an increase in the size of the earnings base upon which CPP contributions
are levied. 119 Along with examining the proposals in the CPP Paper, the
National Council of Welfare actually proposed increasing the benefits paid
under the CPP in order to reduce the level of poverty of some of the CPP's
beneficiaries. 120
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the B.C. government added a different
dimension to the discussion on reforming the CPP. It proposed raising the
ceiling on the YMPE.121 In 1996, the YMPE was $35,400. No contributions
were made on the amount of an employee's salary and wages which exceeded
$35,400. Raising the YMPE would result in more contributions now to the CPP
from higher income earners, but would also entail higher benefits payable to
those people when they eventually retired (because their retirement pensions
115. Two independent reasons were given for this position. Some wanted disability benefits
removed because they believed that the disabled would be better served by a separate
comprehensive program. Others simply wanted to sever the disability pension in order
to ensure that funding for the retirement pension was more secure (Ibid., at 18-19).
116. Quebec, Pour Vous et Vos Enfants: Garantir L'Avenir du regime de Rentes du Quebec,
(June 1996).
117. R. Seguin, " Quebec may double pension payments", The Globe and Mail (14 June,
1996) A5.
118. National Council of Welfare, Improving the Canada Pension Plan, (Minister of Supply
and Services Canada; Autumn, 1996).
119. Ibid., at 12-16.
120. Ibid., at 18 and 24-25.
121. Year's Maximum Pensionable Earnings. See, supra., note 25.
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would be based on this higher amount of contributions). The B.C. proposal
suggested using this increased revenue to maintain the disability benefit and to
continue full indexation for the YBE.12 2
5. Emerging Consensus(?)
Due to the amending formula established under the CPP,123 the B.C. proposal
(and its implicit rejection of the options for reform set out in the CPP Paper)
seemed to indicate that a consensus on the appropriate reforms would be difficult
to achieve. Such a consensus seemed more difficult because several provinces
(most notably Ontario and B.C.) opposed any increase in CPP contribution rates
unless there was a corresponding decrease in Employment Insurance premi-
ums. 1 24 In fact, it was reported that an apparent agreement on reform was
thwarted because of these two issues. 125 Provincial Blackmail", The Toronto
Star (8 October, 1996) A18.
By February of 1997, it appeared that an official agreement had been reached,
although it is unclear as to when the proposed amendments to the CPP would
come into effect. 126 The agreement reached seems to contain the following
provisions:
122. E. Greenspon, "B.C. proposes CPP overhaul", The Globe and Mail (23 September,
1996) Al. Another aspect of the B.C. proposal that does not seem to have received
much attention is that it would require more contributions from those very same "baby
boomers" who were endangering the CPP's stability. For the most part, it is people in
their mid-30's and older who would be most likely to be earning more than the present
YMPE. More contributions from this group of people would seem to address, at least in
part, the "intergenerational fairness" argument so favoured by those who are most
opposed to the operation of the CPP in its present form.
123. CPP, supra, section 114. Any federal legislation which affects CPP benefit levels or
contribution rates cannot come into effect until the third year after an intention to intro-
duce such measures has been laid before Parliament. Further, any federal legislation
which alters CPP benefits, contribution rates or the management of the CPP funds can-
not come into effect unless the cabinets of at least two-thirds of the provinces (not
including Quebec) representing two-thirds of the population of the provinces (not
including Quebec) have signified their consent.
124. Supra, note 122. See also S. McCarthy, "Seniors face cuts in CPP benefits", The
Toronto Star (8 October, 1996) A8.
125. 169
126. In his speech to Parliament introducing the draft legislation to amend the CPP, entitled
the Canada Pension Investment Board Act, the Finance Minister indicated that the
changes would come into effect in 1998; Statement by the Honourable Paul Martin,
Minister of Finance to the House of Commons (14 February, 1997). However, legisla-
tion pursuant to a notice introduced in 1997 could not come into effect until January,
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a) a freeze of the Year's Basic Exemption at $3500;
b) an increase in the contribution rate to 9.9 per cent of contributory salary
and earnings, with the increase to take effect over a six year period;
c) creation of an arm's length agency to manage the CPP fund, with the
fund to be invested in a diversified portfolio of securities;
d) the CPP reserve fund will be increased to the equivalent of 5 years worth
of benefits, and provincial governments would still be able to borrow from
the CPP Investment Fund, but only at market rates;
e) a reduction in the amount of the retirement pension due to a change in
the method of calculating the pension;
f) a reduction in the amount of the disability benefit;
g) tighter administrative eligibility requirements for the disability benefit;
h) an increase in the minimum number of years in which a person must
have contributed to the CPP in order to be eligible for a disability benefit
(to 4 out of the last 6 years);
i) a disabled recipient's retirement pension will be based on the average
wage at the time he or she became disabled, not at the time when he or she
retires, and;
j) a $1000 reduction in the amount of the death benefit. 127
These proposals seemed to have the support of all the provinces except for
Saskatchewan and British Columbia.128 It appeared that this agreement was
made possible because the federal government agreed to the demands of some
provinces to link an increase in CPP premiums with a corresponding decrease
in El premiums. 129 It was also suggested that the B.C. proposals (and others)
2000. While some of the proposed changes might not necessarily be subject to the three
year time limit, arguably some of the proposals would "alter...either directly or indi-
rectly...the general level of benefits provided...or the contribution rate" and so, by rea-
son of section 1.14(2) of the CPP could not come into effect until 2000.
127. Statement by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance to the House of Com-
mons (14 February, 1997), E. Greenspon, "Pension Plan premiums to jump", The Globe
and Mail (15 February, 1997) Al and R. Carrick, "Stocks to bolster CPP", The Globe
and Mail (15 February, 1997) B 1.
128. Statement by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance to the House of Com-
mons (14 February, 1997).
129. E. Greenspon, "Martin strikes CPP deal", The Globe and Mail (14 February, 1997) Al.
It is important to note that if El revenue is reduced (through a decrease in E1 premiums)
and there is a corresponding increase in CPP revenue (through an increase in CPP pre-
miums) the financial burden will be greater for employees than for employers. This is
because for every dollar of contributions by an employee under the El plan the employer
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might form the basis of a second round of reforms of the CPP after the financial
issues have been dealt with. 130
E. CONCLUSIONS
There is no question that, at present, the Canada Pension Plan is an integral part
of the social safety net in Canada. It is likely that the recent reforms will be
determinative as to whether the CPP will continue to play this role. Clearly,
disability benefits will be particularly vulnerable to any restructuring initiatives
which take shape in the months to come.
contributes 1.4 dollars. Under the CPP, for every dollar contributed by the employee the
employer contributes one dollar. Therefore employers make a greater contribution to every
dollar of revenue raised under EI than they do under the CPP. Further, an increase in CPP
premiums will impact disproportionately on the self-employed, because while they have to
contribute to the CPP they do not currently contribute to the EI fund.
130. Supra note 128. It is, however, difficult to imagine what interest most of the parties
would have in extending benefits after having spent most of this round of reform focus-
sing on curtailing them.
